by: Noelle Azarcon – August 1, 2022
Last May, U.S. President Joe Biden formally launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in an effort to promote a ‘free and open’ region amid geopolitical tensions and a trade-war with China. The Biden administration proposed this framework to thrust Washington’s presence in the fields of international trade and security following the Trump administration withdrawal from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in 2017, which consequently undermined Washington’s sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific.
The IPEF includes several initial partners including ASEAN countries such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, as well as Australia, New Zealand, India, South Korea, and most notably, Japan. The framework has four key pillars that focus on developing a digital economy, building resilient supply chains, promoting a climate-resilient economy, and advocating for trade policies that comply with international law.
The future of the 21st century will primarily focus on the Indo-Pacific since approximately 60% of the world’s total population resides in the region. In fact, it is predicted that the region will be the biggest contributor to global growth in the next three decades. As such, it comes as no surprise that the Indo-Pacific is the center of a geopolitical and economic stand-off between Beijing and Washington. While China’s growing economic power and coercive claims of international territories continue to be an impediment to stability in the region, the IPEF will act as Washington’s strategy in reasserting its dominance in the Indo-Pacific. With this, a crucial part of the strategy is to strengthen its alliance with Japan.
As one of the most influential states in Asia, Japan plays a critical function in shaping the regional environment. However, recent political developments suggest that Tokyo is aligning itself with Washington to contain Beijing’s aggressive rise in power. Japan’s active role in helping the United States formulate the IPEF and increasing its attractiveness to other Asian countries seems to underscore this observation.
It is important to note that Japan’s recent move is not only motivated by economic interests. For one, there is a strong sentiment from the Japanese government and business sector to fully support the IPEF, as the nation hopes its gesture would persuade the U.S. to rejoin the CPTPP. Tokyo also intends to strengthen its defense capabilities, and the most obvious way of doing so is to foster a stronger alliance with the United States and its other allies.
Finally, tensions in Europe have prompted Japan to invest in its military capabilities and join the recent NATO summit for the very first time last June, as it fears that China will take advantage of the geopolitical rifts in Europe to have a stronger grip on Asia.
Japan-American relations are mutually advantageous – both countries share the same vision for lessening military conflict and increasing economic prosperity, which can only be achieved through fostering a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Nevertheless, analysts argue that it is unlikely the IPEF will metamorphose into a solid economic bloc, given that it fails to set guidelines for tariff reductions and a wider U.S. market access – two extremely favorable conditions that will convince Asian countries to align themselves with Washington.